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Abstract 
According to the theory of multidimensional game, the paper studies the two-dimensional game of Cournot-Bertrand 
model with incomplete information and its equilibrium, when the two companies have some of the old and the new 
alternative products. It shows that for the new and old products have no substitute, the one-dimensional static game of 
Cournot and Bertrand model is a special case of the two-dimensional static game model. Also, it comes to the 
conclusion that the equilibrium of two-dimensional static game is better than that of one-dimensional static game of 
Cournot and Bertrand model. 
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1. Introduction 
There are many mutual influences between the multiple games among companies in the real economic 
activity, such as the game of some alternative products of business. When enterprises make decisions for 
each product, it could be a multidimensional game. It should consider not only about the competitors’ 
product strategy, but also on the strategy of products which there are some relevant to the needs between 
their competitors and themselves. 
[1] introduces the multidimensional game system, the definition and characteristics, as well as the 
static and dynamic game model and equilibrium with complete and incomplete information. [2,3] studies 
the static and dynamic two-dimensional Cournot-Bertrand game model and their equilibrium with 
 
* * Corresponding author. Tel.: +86-0591-22866717. 
E-mail address: xiangxiaodong2@yahoo.com.cn. 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
896  Xiang Xiaodong and Cao Bing / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 895 – 9022 Xiang Xiaodong,Cao Bing/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 
complete information, when the two companies have some of the old and the new alternative products. [4] 
studies the multidimensional static Bertrand game model and its equilibrium with incomplete information 
in continuous type space. [5]studies the multidimensional static Cournot game model and its equilibrium 
with incomplete information in discrete type space. [6]generally discusses the multidimensional dynamic 
Bertrand game model and its equilibrium with incomplete information in continuous and discrete type 
spaces.[7]compares the equilibrium of complete information and incomplete information Cournot model 
with alternative products, and shows that the alternative of products with incomplete information has 
influence on the equilibrium output and profits.[8]researches the stability of cooperation with the 
multidimensional game theory when duopoly produce two alternative products at the same time.  
In the actual market competition, the existing products have become saturated and the new products 
have not been. Enterprises have some old and new alternative products when they compete on produce. 
To obtain greater profits when new products come to market, companies generally adopt the original 
pricing strategies to compete for the opponent customers, while taking on new product production 
strategies to expand market share. Therefore, the enterprises not only to consider competitors’ production 
strategy of new products, but also consider the original product’s pricing strategy when select a new 
product production strategy. In response, Tan Deqing[3]and Liu Jun[2]discussed the static and dynamic 
duopoly Cournot-Bertrand game model and its equilibrium with complete information. However, 
enterprises do not have a good knowledge of the production costs of competitors in reality, especially the 
new product. This article extends to the case of incomplete information for research. 
2. Two-dimensional Cournot-Bertrand static game model with incomplete information and its 
analysis 
Suppose there are only two firms in a region and they produce some alternative two products A and B. 
Also, the firms monopolize the region’s market. Further, we assume A is a new product and the market is 
not saturated, which the two firms want to increase profits through Cournot game. While B is an old 
product in the market saturated, which the two firms want to increase profits through Bertrand game[2]. 
We do not consider the fixed cost of production without affecting the discussion of the case. It 
supposed that firm 1’s unit cost of A and B is respectively 11C  and 12C , and firm 2’s unit cost of A and B 
is respectively 21C  and 22C .Firm 1 is information disadvantage, that is firm 1’s unit cost of A is 
common knowledge. Firm 2’s unit cost of A is discrete information for private and firm 2 know the cost. 
While firm 1 only know the probability distribution of the costs, that is, μ probability to take lC21  and μ−1  probability to take hC21  ( lC21 < hC21 ). Two firms share the knowledge of the cost of B. 
Assume that firm i(i=1,2) chooses the vector of output and pricing strategy ( )21, ii pq ≥0, ( )21, ii pq ( )21, ii PQ∈ . 1iQ  mean that firm i’s product strategy space of A, while 2iP mean that firm i’s 
pricing strategy space of B. 
For A, the two firms do production game. The inverse demand function[3] (namely, price function) for 
A is assumed to be the following: 
( ) ( ){ }221221111 ,0max qqqqap +−+−= α                                                                         (1) 
Where, 1p is the market price of A, 11q and 12q  respectively are firm 1’s production of A and B, while 
21q  and 22q  respectively are firm 2’s production of A and B. ( )0>αα is the impact factor of the total 
market supply of B to the market price of A. Generally, assuming ( ) ( ) 022122111 >+−+− qqqqa α . 
For B, the two firms do pricing game and assuming demand function of B of firm 1 and 2 as follows: 
12 12 22 1 1q b p p k pβ= − + +                                                                                                       (2) 
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12122222 pkppbq ++−= β                                                                                                    (3) 
There, 12p and 22p  are respectively the price of firm 1 and 2. ( )0>ββ  is the impact factor of the 
rival price to firm’s customer needs. 1k  is the impact factor of A’s price to firm 1, and 2k  is the impact 
factor of A’s to firm 2. Trough formula (2) and (3), we can rewrite (1) as 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]22122111211 121
1
ppbqqa
kk
p +−+−+−++= βααα                                  (4) 
Because firm 2’s A have different costs, 21q  and 22p  will be different[9]. When firm 2’s cost of A 
is lC21 , noting them as
lq21  and
lp22 . When firm 2’s cost of A is
hC21 , noting them as 
hq21  and
hp22 . 
Thus, firm 1’s expected profit function is 
( ) ( )[ ]121212111111 CpqCpqEEU −+−=                                                                             (5) 
Profit function of firm 2 is 
( ) ( )222222211212 CpqCpqU −+−=                                                                                   (6) 
According to formula (2) (3) (4), we can rewrite (5) as 
( ) ( )1 1 11 11 12 12 12EU Ep C q p C q= − + − =
( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
11 21 21
11
1 2 12 22 22
11
1 2 1 1
l h
l h
a q q q
C
k k b p p p
μ μ
α α α β μ μ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥ −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ + ⎡ ⎤+ − + + −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
( )11 12 12q p C+ −
( ) ( )
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
11 21 211
12 22 22
1 2 12 22 22
1
1
1 2 1 1
l h
l h
l h
a q q qk
b p p p
k k b p p p
μ μ
β μ μ α α α β μ μ
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤− − + − −⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤− + + − +⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦ + + ⎢ ⎥+ − + + −⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦⎩ ⎭
              (7) 
When the cost of A of firm 2 is lC21 , we can rewrite (6) as 
=lU 2 ( ) ( )22222221121 CpqCpq lll −+−
( ) ( )11 21 12 22 21 211 2
1 2 1
1
l l l la q q b p p C q
k k
α α βα
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − − − + − + −⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
( )22 22lp C+ −
( ) ( )( )[ ]⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−+−−−++++−
lll ppbqqa
kk
k
ppb 22122111
21
2
1222 121
βαααβ                                                 (8) 
When the cost of A of firm 2 is
hC21 , we can rewrite (6) as 
898  Xiang Xiaodong and Cao Bing / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 895 – 9024 Xiang Xiaodong,Cao Bing/ Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 
=hU 2 ( ) ( )22222221121 CpqCpq hhh −+−
( ) ( )11 21 12 22 21 211 2
1 2 1
1
h h h ha q q b p p C q
k k
α α βα
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − − − + − + −⎨ ⎬⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦+ +⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
( )22 22hp C+ −
( ) ( )( )[ ]⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−+−−−++++−
hhh ppbqqa
kk
k
ppb 22122111
21
2
1222 121
βαααβ                                              (9) 
The profit function is smooth differentiable and we take a use of first-order conditions for optimization[10] 
0
11
1 =∂
∂
p
EU
,
0
12
1 =∂
∂
p
EU
,
0
21
2 =∂
∂
l
l
q
U
,
0
22
2 =∂
∂
l
l
p
U
,
0
21
2 =∂
∂
h
h
q
U
,
0
22
2 =∂
∂
h
h
p
U
,and noting 
( )211
1
kk ++= αγ ,
( )
( ) ( )
1
1 1
2 1
1 2 1 1
k
A
k k
γ α β γ
α β γ α β γ
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ,
( )
( )1 1
1
1
B
k k
γ α β γ
γ β α β γ
⎛ ⎞− −= ⎜ ⎟− − −⎝ ⎠ ,
( )
( )2 2
1
1
C
k k
γ α β γ
γ β α β γ
⎛ ⎞− −= ⎜ ⎟− − −⎝ ⎠ ,
( )
( ) ( )
2
2 2
2 1
1 2 1 1
k
D
k k
γ α β γ
α β γ α β γ
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− −⎣ ⎦⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − − −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ,     
( )
( ) ( )
1 12 11
1 1 12
2
2 1 1
a b k C C
E
b a b k k C
α γ
α γ α β γ
⎛ ⎞− + −⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤+ − + − −⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ,
( )
( ) ( )
2 22 21
2 2 22
2
2 1 1
la b k C C
F
b a b k k C
α γ
α γ α β γ
⎛ ⎞− + −⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤+ − + − −⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ,
( )
( ) ( )
2 22 21
2 2 22
2
2 1 1
ha b k C C
G
b a b k k C
α γ
α γ α β γ
⎛ ⎞− + −⎜ ⎟= ⎜ ⎟⎡ ⎤+ − + − −⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠ ,
Collating into matrix form, we can obtain 
( ) E
p
q
B
p
q
B
p
q
A
h
h
l
l
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛−+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
22
21
22
21
12
11 1 μμ
                                                                           
F
p
q
D
p
q
C
l
l
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
22
21
12
11
                               
G
p
q
D
p
q
C
h
h
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
22
21
12
11
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The solutions are 
( ) ( )[ ]{ }GFBDECBDA
p
q μμ −+−−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−− 1111
*
12
11
                                                         (10) 
( ) ( )[ ]{ }GFBDECBDACDFD
p
q
l
l
μμ −+−−−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−− 111111
*
22
21
                               (11) 
( ) ( )[ ]{ }GFBDECBDACDGD
p
q
h
h
μμ −+−−−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −−−−− 111111
*
22
21
                               (12) 
Thus, we get the Bayes Nash equilibrium solution of the two-dimensional Cournot-Bertrand static 
game model with incomplete information. That is the strategy of firm 1 is ( )*11 12, Tq p and the strategy of 
firm 2 is { ( )*21 22, Tl lq p ， ( )*21 22, Th hq p }. 
3. Comparative analysis of the equilibrium of separate game and two-dimensional game  
We have researched the two-dimensional Cournot-Bertrand static game model with incomplete 
information and its equilibrium. Now, we discuss a special case. When there is no alternative between A 
and B (that is 021 === kkα ), the two firm game through Cournot model with incomplete 
information for A and through Bertrand model with complete information for B. 
When the two firm game through Cournot model with incomplete information for A, firm 1’s expected 
profit function is 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]{ }11212111111111111 1 CqqqaqCpqEEU hl −−++−=−= μμ                                 (13) 
When the cost of firm 2’s A is lC21 , the profit is 
( ) ( )[ ]llllll CqqaqCpqU 212111212112121 −+−=−=                                                                   (14) 
When the cost of firm 2’s A is hC21 , the profit is 
( ) ( )[ ]hhhhhh CqqaqCpqU 212111212112121 −+−=−=                                                                   (15) 
We take a use of first-order conditions for optimization 
0
11
11 =∂
∂
q
EU
,
0
21
21 =∂
∂
l
l
q
U
,
0
21
21 =∂
∂
h
h
q
U
and draw the only equilibrium
( ) ( )[ ]hl CCCaq 212111*11 131231 μμ −++−=                                                                           (16) 
( ) [ ]lhll CCCCaq 21212111*21 61231 −−−−+= μ                                                                         (17) 
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( ) [ ]lhhh CCCCaq 21212111*21 6231 −+−+= μ                                                                               (18) 
When the two firm game through Bertrand model with complete information for B 
( ) ( )( )2212121212121212 ppbCpqCpU β+−−=−=                                                               (19) 
( ) ( )( )1222222222222222 ppbCpqCpU β+−−=−=                                                           (20) 
We take a use of first-order conditions for optimization 
0
12
12 =∂
∂
p
U
,
0
22
22 =∂
∂
p
U
,and draw the only equilibrium
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +++−= 12222
*
12 22
2
4
2
CCbp
ββ
β                                                                               (21) 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +++−= 22122
*
22 22
2
4
2
CCbp
ββ
β                                                                              (22) 
When there is no alternative between A and B, 021 === kkα , formula (10)(11)(12) can rewrite. 
We get the Bayes Nash equilibrium solution of two-dimensional Cournot-Bertrand static game model 
with incomplete information 
( )( )
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +++−
−−++
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
12222
112121*
12
11
22
2
4
2
3
21
3
1
3
1
CCb
CCCa
p
q
hl
ββ
β
μμ
                                                             (23) 
( )( )
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +++−
−−+−+
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
22122
21212111*
22
21
22
2
4
2
2
11
6
1
3
1
3
1
CCb
CCCCa
p
q
lhl
l
ββ
β
μμ
                                                 (24) 
( )( )
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +++−
−−+−+
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
22122
21212111*
22
21
22
2
4
2
2
11
6
1
3
1
3
1
CCb
CCCCa
p
q
hhl
h
ββ
β
μμ
                                             (25) 
From the component of (23)(24)(25), we can find the Bayes Nash equilibrium is same with equilibrium 
of single game,(16)(17)(18)(21)(22). Thus, when there is no alternative between A and B, the Bayes Nash 
equilibrium of two-dimensional static Cournot-Bertrand game model with incomplete information is a 
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simple combination of equilibrium of separate game, which respectively take Cournot game model with 
incomplete information for A and take Bertrand game model with complete information for B. 
4. Analysis of cases 
Based on the above discussion, we can use an example to compare equilibrium profit of the two-
dimensional game and separate game. Generally, assuming a=10,b=12,α =0.2,β =0.3, 1k =0.18, 2k =0.2; 
the cost of firm 1’s A is 11C =0.5, and the cost of B is 12C =0.6; the cost of firm 2’s A 
are
lC21 =0.4,
hC21 =0.55,μ =0.5,and the cost of B is 22C =0.7. 
Taking the parameter values into equations (13)(14)(15) [11]and getting the Bayes Nash equilibrium 
( )*11 12, Tq p = ( )1.9019,8.0485
T
, ( )*21 22, Tl lq p = ( )1.8247,8.1231 T , ( )*21 22, Th hq p =
( )1.7444,8.1254 T . And their total profits are *1EU =58.0842, *2lU =57.5314, *2hU =57.2639. Taking 
the parameter values into equations (19)(20)(21)(24)(25) and getting the equilibrium of separate game 
*
11q =3.1583,
*
12p =7.4194,
*
21
lq =3.2208,
*
21
hq =3.1458,
*
22p =7.4629. And their total profits are 
*
1EU =56.4799,
*
2
lU =56.1108, 
*
2
hU =55.6333. 
The results above indicate that, for the condition that two alternative products with incomplete 
information, the equilibrium profits of separate game are less than the two-dimensional game. 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we study the two-dimensional static Cournot-Bertrand game model with incomplete 
information when there are new and old alternative products. It has been proved that for the new and old 
products have no substitute, one-dimensional static game of Cournot and Bertrand model is a special case 
of the two-dimensional static game model. That is, for the case of no alternative, two-dimensional static 
Cournot-Bertrand game model will degenerate to combination of separate games of Cournot and Bertrand. 
From the analysis cases, we find that for the condition that two alternative products with incomplete 
information, the equilibrium profits of separate game are less than the two-dimensional game. Thus, 
decisions related to the two products together to obtain the optimal results in this case will be considered. 
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